IAEA and Iran: What the Agency Does and What It Said About Isfahan

What is the IAEA?

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an international organisation, based in Vienna, whose Statute gives it two jobs: help countries use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and check that nuclear material is not used for weapons ^[1].

Its Statute was opened for signature on 26 October 1956 ^[1]. Article II says the Agency "shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity" and shall ensure, as far as it can, that its help is "not used in such a way as to further any military purpose" ^[1].

The IAEA is run by three bodies. The General Conference brings together all member states once a year; the Board of Governors, a smaller group of states, takes most decisions; and a Director General, appointed for four-year terms, leads the staff ^[1]. The current Director General is Rafael Mariano Grossi ^[4].

The Statute requires the Director General and staff not to "seek or receive instructions from any source external to the Agency" ^[1]. In practice the Agency reports facts it has verified, and the political decisions are taken by states in the Board and, sometimes, in the UN Security Council ^[1][2].

What does the IAEA inspect in Iran?

Under Iran's safeguards agreement with the Agency, which entered into force on 15 May 1974, the IAEA checks Iran's declared nuclear material and facilities to confirm that none is diverted from peaceful use ^[2].

Iran has declared 22 nuclear facilities and one "location outside facilities" to the IAEA ^[2]. They include research reactors in Tehran and Isfahan, the enrichment plants at Natanz and Fordow, the heavy-water research reactor at Arak (Khondab), and the Bushehr nuclear power plant ^[2].

Inspectors do three main things:

• Accounting: the state must give the Agency nuclear material accounting reports, and the Agency needs on-site access to verify them ^[2].
• Design checks: design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) are the Agency's checks of a facility's declared design; the IAEA asked Iran for both at the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant in February 2026 ^[2].
• Continuity of knowledge: in its September 2026 report the IAEA says it lost continuity of knowledge over previously declared low and highly enriched uranium at the facilities affected by the June 2025 attacks ^[2].

A wider set of checks, the Additional Protocol, allows broader access to information and locations. Iran stopped applying it in February 2021, and since then the IAEA says it has not been able to carry out "complementary access" anywhere in Iran ^[2].

What nuclear facilities are in Isfahan?

Isfahan hosts 9 of Iran's 22 declared nuclear facilities, more than any other city, including the uranium conversion and fuel plants and a fourth enrichment plant declared in June 2025 ^[2][5].

According to the list in the IAEA's September 2026 report, the Isfahan facilities are: the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant (IFEP), the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor, the Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor, the Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor, the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF), the Fuel Manufacturing Plant, the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant, the Enriched UO2 Powder Plant and the Isfahan Research Reactor 10MW ^[2].

There is also a tunnel complex at Isfahan. The IAEA has stated that uranium hexafluoride (UF6) enriched up to 20% and 60% U-235 was stored there ^[2]. In February 2026 the Agency told Iran it had seen, on commercial satellite imagery, "regular vehicular activity around the entrance" of that tunnel complex, and asked Iran to allow verification at the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant and the relevant parts of the tunnel complex. According to the report, Iran did not provide access at the plant and said that both the plant and the tunnel complex had been "subjected to illegal military attacks" ^[2].

The IAEA judges that four Isfahan facilities that held nuclear material (UCF, the fuel plant, the plate plant and the UO2 powder plant) were affected by the June 2025 attacks ^[2]. The research reactors at Isfahan were on its list of facilities that were not affected ^[2].

What did the IAEA say about Isfahan on 13 November 2026?

In a confidential quarterly report to member states, seen by Reuters and AP on 13 November 2026, the IAEA said it was "increasingly concerned" that Iran has not allowed it to inspect the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant or see its design plans ^[5][6].

The report, as quoted by Reuters, says: "The agency does not know IFEP's exact location, status for safeguards purposes or whether it contains nuclear material" ^[5]. Iran declared the plant to the IAEA on 12 June 2025; an inspection planned for 13 June 2025 could not take place because the bombing campaign started that day ^[5].

The report also repeated that the Agency's lack of information about Iran's enriched uranium, and its lack of access to verify it, is "a matter of serious proliferation concern" that "needs to be rectified with the utmost urgency" ^[5]. Al Jazeera, citing AFP, AP and Reuters, noted that the report did not establish that enrichment is taking place at the Isfahan plant ^[6].

The IAEA encouraged Iran to "consider technical and gradual measures" that would allow inspectors to return ^[5]. It said it is "fully prepared to resume its safeguards activities in Iran at short notice" ^[6].

The November report itself is confidential; only press accounts of it are available. Earlier reports become public when the Board decides to derestrict them; the September 2026 report (GOV/2026/50) was derestricted on 9 September 2026 ^[2].

How much enriched uranium does Iran have, according to the IAEA?

The IAEA's last estimate, as of 13 June 2025, was 9,874.9 kg of enriched uranium in total, including 440.9 kg enriched up to 60% U-235; it cannot say how much exists now or where it is ^[2].

The IAEA's reports call uranium enriched up to 60% highly enriched uranium (HEU) ^[2]. CBC, in its report on the November document, describes 60% as "a short, technical step away" from weapons-grade levels of 90% ^[5]. The IAEA says Iran is the only non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT to have produced and accumulated uranium enriched up to 60% ^[3].

Of the 440.9 kg, the Agency had verified 432.9 kg before the attacks ^[2]. Since then, the IAEA says, "the Agency cannot provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts" of the stockpile ^[2].

CBC, citing an AP interview from 2025, reported that Grossi said the stockpile could allow Iran to build as many as 10 bombs if it decided to weaponise, and added that this does not mean Iran has such a weapon ^[5].

The table below sets out the 2025 estimate by enrichment level as published by the IAEA.

Why can't IAEA inspectors get into Iran's sites?

Because the IAEA withdrew its inspectors for safety reasons during the June 2025 attacks, Iran then passed a law suspending cooperation, and further strikes from 28 February 2026 halted verification again ^[2][3].

The sequence, as set out in the IAEA's own reports ^[2][3]:

1. 13-24 June 2025: Israeli attacks on several Iranian nuclear facilities; on 22 June 2025 the United States attacked three facilities. The IAEA stopped verification and withdrew its inspectors.
2. 2 July 2025: Iran's president signed a law suspending cooperation with the Agency.
3. 9 September 2025: the Director General and Iran's foreign minister signed the Cairo agreement on inspection procedures; on 20 November 2025 Iran told the IAEA it regarded the agreement as terminated.
4. 28 February 2026: further US and Israeli attacks; the IAEA again stopped verification.
5. 1-3 June 2026: the IAEA carried out an inspection and design information verification at the Bushehr power plant.

According to CBC, the only facility the IAEA has inspected since June 2025 is Bushehr, most recently on 12-15 September 2026 ^[5]. According to Al Jazeera's account of the report, Iran told the IAEA in November 2026 that discussion on resuming inspections cannot continue amid "persistent, explicit, and public threats" by the US president to commit further armed aggression ^[6].

The Director General has repeatedly said that nuclear facilities "must never be attacked", and that implementation of Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement "could not be suspended under any circumstances" ^[2].

Is there a radiation risk for people in Iran?

On 2 March 2026 the IAEA Director General said that, so far, no elevation of radiation levels above the usual background had been detected in countries bordering Iran ^[4].

In the same statement, Grossi called the situation "very concerning" and said the Agency could not rule out "a possible radiological release with serious consequences" ^[4]. That was the position on 2 March; for the current situation, check the IAEA's latest statements.

For people in Iran and in neighbouring countries, practical points:

• Prefer the IAEA's own statements and independent international media for radiation information; treat unverified social-media claims with caution.
• In an emergency, follow the instructions of civil-protection and public-health authorities, and check them against the IAEA's own updates where possible.
• Do not take medicines such as iodine tablets on the strength of rumours; use them only if official health authorities advise it.

This section is general safety information, not medical advice.