What Are Passkeys? How Passwordless Sign-In Works
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In short
A passkey is a sign-in credential based on FIDO standards that replaces a password with a pair of cryptographic keys [1]. You unlock it with your device's fingerprint, face check or PIN [6]. Because it works only with the genuine website, it resists phishing [5]. The UK's NCSC now recommends passkeys as consumers' first choice where offered [4].
Key takeaways
- A passkey uses a key pair: the public key is stored by the website, and the private key stays with you; the server never learns it [7].
- Passkeys are phishing-resistant because sign-in is cryptographically tied to the real service; codes and passwords can be relayed, passkeys cannot [5].
- On 23 April 2026 the UK's National Cyber Security Centre said passkeys should be consumers' first choice of login wherever they are available [4].
- The FIDO Alliance estimated in May 2026 that 5 billion passkeys are in use and that 75% of surveyed consumers had enabled one on at least one account [2].
- Synced passkeys are backed up to a cloud account, so that account needs strong protection; US federal guidance allows them at AAL2 but not AAL3 [3].
- Where a service has no passkeys, use a strong unique password, ideally from a password manager, plus two-step verification [4][6].
On this page 11 sections
- What are passkeys?
- How do passkeys work?
- Why are passkeys safer than passwords and codes?
- What is the difference between synced and device-bound passkeys?
- How do you set up a passkey?
- What are the limits and risks of passkeys?
- What happens next for passkeys?
- Common mistakes
- Frequently asked questions
- Glossary
- Sources
What are passkeys?
A passkey is a sign-in credential based on FIDO standards. It can be stored on a phone, a computer or a hardware security key [1]. Instead of typing a password, you approve the sign-in with the method you already use to unlock your device, such as a fingerprint, face check or PIN [1][6].
The technology is built on FIDO2, a set of open standards that includes W3C WebAuthn and the Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP) [1]. The FIDO Alliance, an industry standards body, coordinates the work, and Apple, Google and Microsoft support passkeys in their platforms [7][8][9].
Google lists three things passkeys cannot do that passwords can: they cannot be shared, copied or written down, and they cannot be accidentally given to someone else [8]. You do not have to remember anything new [6].
Are passkeys the same as passwordless sign-in?
Passkeys are one form of passwordless sign-in. Microsoft, for example, announced in May 2025 that brand-new Microsoft accounts would be "passwordless by default", offering options such as passkeys [9]. Some passwordless methods, such as codes sent by email or SMS, do not have the same phishing resistance as passkeys [3].
How do passkeys work?
Passkeys use public-key cryptography. When you create a passkey, your device makes a unique pair of keys for that account [7]. The public key is stored on the website's server. The private key stays with you, and the server never learns what it is [7].
When you sign in, the website sends a challenge. Your device asks you to unlock it, then uses the private key to sign the challenge. The site checks the signature with the public key it holds; NIST describes WebAuthn as a challenge-response cryptographic protocol [3]. The FIDO Alliance notes that because no password is stored, the server holds no shared secret for attackers to steal [1].
Why can't a fake website steal a passkey?
The NCSC explains that traditional two-step methods stay vulnerable because secrets or approvals can be observed and relayed during a live session. Passkeys remove that whole class of attack by cryptographically binding authentication to the legitimate service [5]. In practice, a passkey made for one site will not work on a look-alike phishing site [5].
US guidance agrees. CISA, the US cybersecurity agency, says FIDO/WebAuthn is the only widely available phishing-resistant authentication [12]. NIST lists WebAuthn/FIDO2 among its examples of phishing-resistant authentication [3].
Is a passkey really two factors?
Yes, when the device checks who you are. The NCSC says that where user verification is performed, a FIDO2 credential combines something you have (the cryptographic key) with something you are or know (your fingerprint, face or PIN) [5]. NIST likewise treats a credential as multi-factor only when the device has verified the user [3].
Why are passkeys safer than passwords and codes?
In April 2026 the NCSC published a technical report on login methods. It concludes that passkeys are at least as secure as, and generally more secure than, the strongest password combined with two-step verification [4]. The NCSC assesses that all traditional MFA methods are inherently phishable. That includes SMS codes, email codes, app-generated one-time codes and push approvals [5].
Passkeys also avoid problems that come with passwords:
- No reuse: each passkey is unique to one account [7], so a breach at one site cannot be replayed at another.
- Nothing to guess: the NCSC says passkeys cannot be intercepted, reused or guessed the way passwords can [4].
- Less to steal from servers: a server stores only a public key, not a secret [1][7].
They are also faster. The NCSC says passkey logins can be up to eight times faster than signing in with a username, password and two-step code [4]. Microsoft reported that passkey sign-ins succeed about 98% of the time, against 32% for passwords [9].
How common are passkeys now?
As of its May 2026 estimate, the FIDO Alliance said about 5 billion passkeys are in use worldwide [2]. Its survey of 11,000 consumers in ten countries found that 90% were aware of passkeys, 75% had enabled one on at least one account, and 49% used them regularly when available [2]. The NCSC cites Google data showing that just over 50% of active Google users in the UK have a passkey registered [4]. These figures are estimates and surveys, not audited counts.
What is the difference between synced and device-bound passkeys?
There are two kinds of passkey [1]:
- Synced passkeys are kept in a cloud service and move between your devices [1]. Apple Passwords, Google Password Manager and Samsung Pass are examples of credential managers that do this [6]. The NCSC notes that your credential manager backs up passkeys, so losing one device should not lock you out [6].
- Device-bound passkeys stay on one device. Passkeys stored on a FIDO security key are device-bound [1].
NIST's 2025 digital identity guidelines allow synced ("syncable") authenticators at Authenticator Assurance Level 2 (AAL2) but not at the highest level, AAL3. The reason is that syncing requires the key to be exportable [3]. Keys stored in the sync service must be encrypted. Access to them must be protected by multi-factor authentication equivalent to AAL2 [3].
Is syncing a security risk?
It moves the risk rather than removing it. The NCSC notes that most people already rely on similar cloud sync for password managers, email and some authenticator apps. The key control is how strongly the sync account itself is protected [5]. Apple says iCloud Keychain is end-to-end encrypted with keys that Apple does not know, and that any Apple Account using it requires two-factor authentication [7].
For people at high risk of targeted attacks, CISA's mobile security guidance says hardware FIDO security keys are the most effective option where feasible, while passkeys are an acceptable alternative [11].
How do you set up a passkey?
- Check your devices. Google lists support on Windows 10, macOS Ventura, ChromeOS 109 or later, and on phones running Android 9 or iOS 16 or later. Supported browsers are Chrome 109+, Safari 16+, Edge 109+ and Firefox 122+ [8].
- Turn on a screen lock. Google says your phone needs a screen lock first. On Apple devices, iCloud Keychain must be on [8].
- Find the option. Look in an account's security or sign-in settings, or accept the prompt when a service invites you to upgrade [6].
- Create and approve. Choose to create a passkey and unlock your device when asked. For a Google Account, repeat this on each device you want to use, or use a hardware security key [8].
- Remove weaker fallbacks where you can. CISA advises that once an account is enrolled in FIDO-based authentication, you should disable less secure forms of MFA [11]. It notes that some services may still use SMS during account recovery [11].
What if I lose my phone?
With synced passkeys, losing one device does not remove access, because the passkeys are on your other devices and in the backup [6][7]. For a Google Account, sign in from another device and remove the passkey stored on the lost one [8]. Apple's escrow recovery for iCloud Keychain allows only 10 attempts before the escrow record is destroyed [7].
What are the limits and risks of passkeys?
- Your device becomes the key. Google warns that on a device with your passkey, anyone who can unlock that device can access your Google Account, even after you sign out [8]. Create passkeys only on devices you personally own and use [8].
- You still depend on the credential manager. The NCSC notes that users still depend on the security of their devices and credential managers. It adds that services should offer clear ways to manage and remove credentials and to recover accounts [5].
- Old fallbacks can remain. A Google passkey does not replace your existing recovery methods [8]. CISA warns that enrolling a stronger method does not automatically remove SMS, which can leave a weak fallback [11].
- Moving between ecosystems. Passkeys used to be hard to move between providers. The FIDO Alliance's Credential Exchange Protocol now allows app-to-app transfers. It launched on iOS 26 on 15 September 2025, and Bitwarden's 23 July 2026 update says it now works on Android 14 or later with Google Play services 26.21 or higher [10]. Bitwarden's explainer describes the specifications as working drafts and notes that passkeys with a hidden counter cannot be transferred [10].
- Not every site supports them. Where passkeys are not available, the NCSC advises strong passwords, for example from a password manager, together with two-step verification [6].
None of these limits changes the NCSC's overall assessment. Its analysis does not assume perfect use or perfect implementation, and it still finds passkeys stronger than the best traditional MFA [5].
What happens next for passkeys?
Official advice has moved quickly. In 2025 the NCSC stopped short of endorsing passkeys because of implementation challenges. In April 2026 it said industry progress meant it could now recommend them to the public [4]. It says this change will be reflected through an ongoing refresh of its guidance rather than one sudden switch [5].
Business adoption is also growing. The FIDO Alliance's 2026 survey of 1,400 decision-makers found that 68% of organisations had deployed or were deploying passkeys for employee sign-in [2]. More than 200 organisations have taken the FIDO Alliance's Passkey Pledge [2].
Passwords will not vanish soon. Many services still rely on them, and the NCSC's advice for those services remains a password manager plus two-step verification [4]. One practical approach, as of 3 November 2026, is to add passkeys to your most important accounts first: email, cloud storage and banking where offered. Keep strong passwords and 2SV everywhere else.
| Sign-in method | Phishing-resistant? | Main weakness |
|---|---|---|
| Password only | No [3] | Can be guessed, reused or phished [4] |
| Password + SMS code | No [5] | SMS can be intercepted via SS7 flaws or SIM swap [12] |
| Password + authenticator-app code | No [5] | Codes can be relayed on a fake site [12] |
| Password + push approval | No [5] | Push bombing and relay [12] |
| Synced passkey | Yes [5] | Depends on security of the sync account [5]; allowed at AAL2, not AAL3 [3] |
| Device-bound passkey or security key | Yes [12] | Keep a second key or recovery option in case it is lost |
Common mistakes
Creating a passkey on a shared or borrowed device
Fix: Google warns that anyone who can unlock that device can access your account. Create passkeys only on devices you own, and remove any made by mistake [8].
Leaving SMS codes switched on after adding a passkey
Fix: CISA advises disabling less secure MFA once FIDO authentication is set up, because enrolling a new method does not remove SMS automatically [11].
Using a weak device PIN
Fix: The passkey is only as protected as the device unlock [5]. Use a strong screen lock and protect the sync account with two-factor authentication [7].
Assuming every 'passwordless' login is phishing-resistant
Fix: Email and SMS codes are not phishing-resistant under NIST's guidance [3]. Only FIDO-based methods such as passkeys are [12].
Deleting all passwords as soon as passkeys appear
Fix: Many services still need passwords. Keep strong unique passwords and 2SV where passkeys are not offered [6].
Frequently asked questions
Are passkeys safer than passwords?
Yes, according to the UK's NCSC, which found passkeys at least as secure as, and generally more secure than, the strongest password combined with two-step verification [4]. They resist phishing because they are tied to the real service [5].
Does the website get my fingerprint or face data?
No. The fingerprint, face check or PIN only unlocks the key on your device [6]. The website stores only a public key and never learns the private key [7].
What happens to my passkeys if I lose my phone?
Synced passkeys are backed up by your credential manager, so you should not lose access [6]. Sign in elsewhere and remove the passkey from the lost device [8].
Can I move passkeys between Apple, Google and password managers?
Increasingly, yes. The Credential Exchange Protocol supports app-to-app transfer on iOS 26 and, per Bitwarden's July 2026 update, Android 14 or later, though Bitwarden describes the specifications as working drafts [10].
Do passkeys replace two-factor authentication?
For a Google Account, signing in with a passkey skips the separate second step [8]. The NCSC counts a passkey with user verification as multi-factor in itself [5].
Should I use a hardware security key instead?
For people at high risk of targeted attacks, CISA calls hardware FIDO keys the most effective option where feasible, and passkeys an acceptable alternative [11].
Glossary
- Passkey
- A FIDO-standard sign-in credential stored on a phone, computer or security key that replaces a password [1].
- FIDO2
- The set of open standards behind passkeys, including W3C WebAuthn and CTAP [1].
- Phishing resistance
- The ability of a sign-in method to stop secrets being disclosed to an impostor site without relying on the user spotting the fake [3].
- Synced passkey
- A passkey backed up to a cloud service and available on all your devices [1].
- Device-bound passkey
- A passkey that stays on one device, such as a hardware security key [1].
- Credential manager
- The NCSC's term for a password manager that creates, stores and syncs passkeys, such as Apple Passwords or Google Password Manager [6].
- AAL2 / AAL3
- NIST Authenticator Assurance Levels; synced authenticators are allowed at AAL2 but not AAL3 [3].
Sources
- Passkeys: passwordless authentication FIDO Alliance
- FIDO Alliance Reports Accelerating Global Passkey Adoption on World Passkey Day 2026 FIDO Alliance · 2026-05-07
- NIST SP 800-63B-4: Digital Identity Guidelines, Authentication and Authenticator Management US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
- NCSC: Leave passwords in the past - passkeys are the future UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) · 2026-04-23
- Passkeys are more secure than traditional ways to log in UK National Cyber Security Centre (Dave Chismon) · 2026-04-23
- Passkeys: what you need to know UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)
- About the security of passkeys Apple Support
- Sign in with a passkey instead of a password Google Account Help
- Pushing passkeys forward: Microsoft's latest updates for simpler, safer sign-ins Microsoft Security Blog · 2025-05-01
- Security vendors join forces to make passkeys more portable for everyone Bitwarden (updated 23 July 2026)
- Mobile Communications Best Practice Guidance, version 2.0 US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) · 2025-11-24
- Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA (fact sheet) US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
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